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P ractical Action has been working on community based EWS (early warning  systems)in Nepal since 2002 - specifically on systems which give early warning of flood. As aresult of its own learning, on-going community feedback, and “real time” evaluation,
Practical Action has become convinced of a number of key issues.
? Investment in EWS is a cost effective use of limited resources where risk can be
anticipated and measured. Vulnerable communities have a right to such warning.
? High tech/high cost systems are not only inappropriate but unsustainable. Use of
local resources both cuts costs and ensures greater ownership.
? Systems should provide information, not warnings per se. Making information intelligible
and user friendly are fundamental to any system.
? Users of information should be active participants in systems, not beneficiaries of
them. Systems must be established which put users first and at their centre.
? Systems should be based on the principal of “demand for”, not “supply of” information.
? Successful EWS are the product of effective person to person communication and
efficient social networks. Communication technologies merely complement these.
? Systems should dictate the technology and not technology the system.
We hope this publication helps summarise Practical Action’s learning in EWS and offers
practical insight in to how such systems can be replicated and developed elsewhere. We
encourage you to make use of the information included on the enclosed CD/DVDs as
limited space has precluded the sharing of all the information available in one publication.
Additional information can also be found at www.practicalaction.org/earlywarning
Project CD This CD contains an electronic version of
the text contained in this book in both PDF and Text
formats. The documents are provided so users can edit
and use elements of the text as they require.
Practical Action actively encourages such use
and asks simply that the source of the
original be acknowledged in any use.
The CD also contains over 70
pages of “Set-up Notes” on
which the text of the River
Basin Systems section is
based, design documents
for EWS towers
established in Chitwan
and Nawalparasi, PDF
files of awareness
materials used
during the projects
and other
background
material.
Project DVD This 30 minute film
covers the various stages in the
setting up and functioning of all
systems highlighted in this
book. It is intended as a
briefing and training
resource and is available
for transmission in any
forum without the
prior approval of
Practical Action or
the European
Commission
though credit
should be given.
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1Globally, Nepal is perhaps unique in the diversityof its topography and geography. For manysynonymous with the high peaks of the Himalayas
just under 50% of its population actually live in the flat plains
of the Terai, a region running from one end of the country to
the other parallel to the Indian border. Though occupying
only 17% of the country’s land mass the Terai is responsible
for the bulk of the country's agricultural output, supports the
main communication and transportation arteries, and carries
its major river systems.
Watered by three major river systems, the Kosi, Narayani and
Karnali, the population of the Terai are exposed to floods
annually, the impacts of which have grown in severity and
regularity in recent years. The reasons for this are many, with
climate change often cited as the most critical, but in truth the
area has experienced massive population growth and
intensification of agriculture over the last 50 years, to the extent
that cause and effect are blurred. Perhaps the reasons are not
so important, given that the impacts are so clear?
For hundreds and often thousands of people each year monsoon
related floods result in massive loss of property, erosion of land,
destruction of irreplaceable assets, death of live stock, spoiling
of stored food stuffs and ultimately, loss of life.
Hand in hand with this exposure to risk, Nepal suffers from
low levels of electrification, poor telephone connectivity, a
meager and seasonally disrupted road network, political
upheaval which has only recently moved beyond the stage
of open conflict, ethnic, religious and linguistic division and
an only slowly expanding economy.
In this context, it is not surprising that the resources available
to government authorities for development activities are
limited, with post emergency relief being a major budgetary
priority in endemically flood prone areas. In recent years
however the Government of Nepal has begun to prioritise
DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) and preparedness activities,
signing up to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in
2005 and moving towards initiating a new National Disaster
Management Strategy, Policy and Act during 2009, all of
which will incorporate DRR.
Within these the role and importance of effective EWS is a
stated priority.
Nepal
According to the UNDP report
“Reducing Disaster Risk: A challenge
for development,” Nepal ranks 12th in
the world in terms of the proportion
of its population exposed to the threat
of flood annually (23.74%). The vast bulk
of those at risk live in the Terai.
2T he literature of early warning uses a numberof different terminologies and classifications forthe stages necessary to establish EWS. Broadly
speaking however they can be summarised as:
1. Risk awareness
2. Monitoring and warning
3. Dissemination of warning
4. Community response
In relation to flood risk in Nepal the present situation
probably differs little from that in many developing
countries.
Risk awareness
At the national level many hazard studies and
ranking exercises have been carried out with
a growing number of area or sector specific
risk assessments being supported by NGOs and
research organisations over the last decade in
particular.
At community level awareness levels vary widely, so
that while urban populations have a growing awareness
of earthquake risk issues – through the running of public
awareness and mass media campaigns – rural
populations have far less awareness or understanding
of flood or landslide risk. Awareness levels are rising,
but from a very low base.
Theory
“If we can get information before the floods
come, it will save our lives. We may not be able
to rescue everything, but our children and
families will be saved”
– Shri Ram, Holiya
3Finally leaflets were given out explaining the specific
warnings and what people should do on receiving
them.
Prior to these material distributions wall paintings,
song competitions, street theatre, and schools art
and essay competitions were used to highlight what
could be achieved if communities could get some
warning.
None of these activities were new or unique, but the fact
that they took community members past the stage of mere
"awareness", to understanding and action, was critical.
It is interesting to note that this was the first time that
Biraha (Awadhi) and Kathaura (Tharu) song
competitions had been used for public awareness
purposes and that it helped revive what were becoming
forgotten cultural practices.
Raising awareness in Banke and Bardia.
Practical Action were aware that awareness campaigns
had been run previously in Banke and Bardia, but these
had only really been run through FM radio, tended to
be ‘generic’ in nature and were solely in Nepali.
In an ethnically and linguistically diverse area the need
for multi language materials and content was clear,  not
just so information could be understood but also so it
would be accepted.  The need for more specific
information was also identified if communities were to
be taken beyond the stage of mere “awareness” to
genuine understanding.
As such radio “jingles” were supplemented with
interviews and discussions on air, with these being
broadcast in Tharu and Awadhi languages as well as
Nepali, to appeal to the larger minority groups in the
area.  These specifically focused on the issue of flood,
its causes and effects.
At the same time community level awareness
campaigns took place, in the form of three rounds of
house to house distributions and discussions led by
women's groups over a period of several months.
Firstly posters were distributed. These used imagery
familiar within the Terai incorporated into pictures
highlighting typical stages in flood preparedness,
warning and response. These images were
complemented with captions in three languages.
A distribution of 6,000 calendars then built on this, by
incorporating these images within the four stages
necessary to establish a successful EWS, highlighting
in particular the routes through which warning could
be communicated. The calendars also carried critical
district emergency telephone numbers and photographs
of the actual upstream monitoring stations used in the
EWS to assist familiarity with the warning system at
the household level.
4Monitoring and warning
At the macro level the DH&M (Department of Hydrology
and Meteorology) is linked into regional monsoon
forecasting systems – which give broad brush stroke
information on rain likelihoods, duration and intensity,  and
has a specific section for flood monitoring & forecasting. To
support this a network of monitoring stations covering all
the major river systems was established in 1987 using HF
radio to report water levels. A wireless data transmission
system has also been in operation on the Narayani river
system since 2007. While historically data gathered has
been used mainly for long-term planning purposes,
commitment now exists that this type of information should
be used for the benefit of ordinary people, through more
active dissemination.
Dissemination of warning
This represents the biggest challenge for Nepal at the
moment - bridging the gap between those with information
and those who do not, along with bridging the gap in
terms of making information intelligible and accessible to
ordinary people. At present very little has been done, with
the small investment in EWS to date being primarily for
the protection of infrastructure, not people.
“ ”
....it is not only this year. We were interested in disseminating information
on rainfall and river levels in previous years as well, but in those days such
a system didn't exist.
– Prakash Chand, news coordinator of Bageswori FM
5Community response
Many NGOs in particular are actively engaged in DRR
activities in Nepal. These have spread the understanding
and practice of numerous risk reduction and capacity building
activities, to the extent that many risk prone communities
are now well versed in the language and methodologies of
VCA (Vulnerability Capacity Assessment) and CBDM
(Community Based Disaster Management) planning.  As such
the ground is well prepared for the introduction and/or
incorporation of EWS in to on-going DRR programmes.
In Nepal most inputs to date have been put in to the highest
and lowest levels of the process, so that while awareness
has been raised and community capacity increased, there
has been little investment at the intermediate levels.
It is at these levels where the greatest gaps exist and where
Practical Action has been concentrating its activities.
1. The monitoring and communication of real time risk
information – primarily by and from formal institutions –
in a meaningful, timely and understandable way to
communities.
2. The dissemination of that warning at and through
community structures.
“
”
I am extremely happy to be
working with Practical Action, to
be helping my community to
prepare for floods. For me, it is
like a mother helping her new
born child – caring and looking
after it. It is all about saving lives
– there is nothing more
important than that.
– Nirmala Pokharel, Parsauni,
Nawalparasi
6In 2002 Practical Action carried out a pilotproject, erecting an observation tower andsiren system in Bhandara, Chitwan. The project was
implemented to assess the potential and opportunity for
purely local level observation and warning of flood with its
objectives set very much within the operational and security
environment prevalent in 2002. Specifically that government
institutions were finding it increasingly difficult to operate in
many rural locations, while the deteriorating security
environment made it imperative that whatever systems were
established they be community managed and independent
of outside support.
Construction of the tower and provision of siren systems
were managed by Practical Action while site identification,
land purchase, community mobilisation, awareness raising
and establishing a user committee were the responsibility of
the community.
Early
Days
7System design
Due to the lack of reliable mains electricity supply a locally available
siren, which could run off a 12 volt (i.e. car) battery was selected.
With nominal 1.5 Kms range this proved satisfactory in testing
but under real-life conditions (i.e. periods of torrential rain falling
primarily on metal, sheet roofs) actual range was found to be far
less. Similarly power draw on the batteries provided was higher
than stated, requiring regular recharging. While the system and
the extent of the
warning was
never meant to
depend on the
range of the siren
alone, it was
realised that in establishing future systems greater range would
have to be sort. It was also found that while the siren itself
performed reliably, associated battery and switch systems
proved less robust, with resultant sustainability questions
having to be asked.
Tower construction was carried out through commercial
tender, partly as this was a new technical area for Practical
Action, but primarily due to time constraints and donor
requirements. While the tower has proved satisfactory in
operation its method of construction provided valuable learning
as it was realised incorporation of locally priortised features
in to the design and community labour into the construction
would greatly increase long term ownership.
“The tower can be of great use
in alerting people to flood. There
would not have been such big
casualties and losses in the flood
of 1993 if there had been an
early warning system then.”
– Sabitra Pandey, Bhandara.
8Why Bhandara ?
“One rainy night in 1993, a huge flood entered the
village. The flood destroyed my house, took 24 cattle
and the crops of 2 Bighas of land, forcing me to
move to the northern part of Bhandara, nearer to
the forest.”
– Nawaraj Silwal, 50, Bhandara
Bhandara sits on the East Rapti river, 23 Kms east of
Narayangadh (Bharatpur), the district capital of Chitwan. In
common with many riverside settlements in Chitwan and
eastern Nawalparasi the opposite bank of the river is
occupied by the Chitwan National Park, the thick vegetation
of which protects the southern bank and encourages flood
waters to erode and inundate communities on the northern
bank during the annual monsoon. Bhandara was selected, as
while fertile and picturesque - it lies in the tourist belt - it
has been regularly hit without warning by floods, the most
catastrophic in recent times being in 1993.
9Though a single 'stand alone' project experience gained
through its implementation and follow up visits which have
continued ever since have generated valuable learning.
Strengths
? Greater peace of mind was created within the community
through the knowledge that someone was watching the
river, 24hrs a day.
? Providing something tangible acted as a spur and catalyst
for other activities in the community, the tower having a
strong psychological impact.
? Alternative income generating activities, primarily bird
and animal viewing, were unanticipated spin-offs (the
tower overlooking the Chitwan National Park).
Weaknesses
? Insufficient attention to community sensitisation and
mobilisation reduced awareness and participation.
? Too much focus on a ‘quick fix’ technical solution, when it
became apparent software components were as, if not
more, important.
? Difficulties in managing expectations in regards to what
the system could actually achieve.
? Siren components were inappropriate for the job, neither
having the simplicity of manual systems, nor the reach or
capacity of 220/240 volt systems.
? An insufficiently participatory approach to tower design.
? Lack of awareness and training information in local
languages.
? The inability to link to external support structures  or
information sources.
Conclusions
? Having something visual, or somewhere specifically
designated from where observations and warnings can
be made, is a real plus.
? The technical elements of a warning systems have to be
self contained if reliant on electricity, as well as highly
robust.
? Communities have to be made aware that systems are
reliant on their own motivation and organisation, as
technical elements can only complement these human
components.
? Committees or individuals responsible for system
management must be truly representative.
? The concept of early warning being new, it is best
introduced as part of a more general DRR project,
particularly one providing more immediate tangible
benefits.
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Chitwan and Nawalparasi
In expanding its programme Practical  Action chose to remain in the same geographical area
extending downstream, west, to the communities of Piple, Jagatpur and Meghauli on the Rapti river
in Chitwan, and then on into Pithauli, Kolhuwa and Parsauni on the Narayani river, in Nawalparasi.
Within these communities approximately 34,500 individuals now benefit from the setting up of the
EWS and other project activities, with the latter including the distribution of 70 life jackets and
other life saving equipment, construction of 15 boats, 6 bridges, 9 spurs and dykes, and 6 shelters,
as well as a broad range of public awareness and education activities including poster and leaflet
distributions, FM broadcasts, street
theatre, song and dance competitions
and schools activities.
Chitwan and Nawalparasi are
among the most flood prone
districts in Nepal, appearing
high on the lists of loss and
damage each year.
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"Watch and Warn"
   Community level observation
Practical Action’s next step was to build onthe learning of its pilot project, address itsshort comings, and increase the impact and coverage
of future systems.
As the launching of an EWS programme in isolation was
unlikely to generate much enthusiasm, it was decided it would
be incorporated within a wider CBDM programme,
containing elements of more immediate benefit to
communities. As such the EWS would be only one component,
albeit a critical one, of a broader risk reduction programme.
The concept of early warning being new, it was constantly
raised during other activities, to generate discussion and
familiarity, and to ensure communities were actively engaged
in its formulation. In these discussions, a number of key issues
were stressed;
? Any technology Practical Action introduced was not going
to provide early warning in itself. It would merely assist
the spreading of early warning within communities, by
the communities themselves.
? “Triggers” for early warning would be human, not
mechanical, it being up to communities to decide what
these triggers might be - as the circumstances in each
community differed.
? Early warning systems were useless without general and
widespread understanding and the establishment of
appropriate response mechanisms.
12
It was critical that the concept of self reliance be accepted,
as at this point there was no indication of any district
government support, nor assistance from national level
institutions, such as the DH&M. As such it was asked what
communities felt could be achieved through local observation
and warning alone, with the following observations being
common to all locations:
? To date there was no formal system of watching taking
place, so many people were watching the river at the
same time during periods of high water.
? Due to the prevalent rainfall patterns floods tended to
come at night. This meant people had to keep watch
especially, rather than as part of their routine activities.
? Many houses and locations at risk to flood had no clear
view of the river making frequent visits necessary during
periods of high water.
? Water ingress was not observable in many places, due to
the lie of the land and dense vegetation during the
monsoon period. This meant flood waters often entered
houses before people were even aware that there was a
threat, making it impossible to save anything but the most
important things.
? Many people lost sleep during the high water periods,
due to stress and worry.
From this communities agreed that;
? Formal “watch and warn” rotas would be set-up, or full
time watchmen paid during the critical flood periods, to
watch on behalf of everyone.
? Sites would be identified giving the best view of both the
river and community, given that water often flowed into
villages from directions other than the nearest river bank.
? Some form of warning, which everyone could understand,
should be established.
As such Practical Action agreed to design, source, fund and
manage the construction of watch towers where
communities could identify appropriate observation sites and
contribute labour. This was based upon the strong
psychological impact the tower had had in Practical Action’s
previous project and as a result of community visits to the
Bhandara site, which generated much enthusiasm. Towers
were erected in 5 out of the 6 communities targeted,
incorporating design improvements influenced both by
learning from Bhandara and ideas generated within the new
project area.
Experience suggested reliance on mains electricity was
unwise, so alternative sources of warning were discussed.
Study revealed no existing ‘indigenous’ warning systems -
which was not unexpected given that most communities
were made up of migrants and flood was a recent
phenomena - nor that any locally manufactured hand sirens
or warning systems were available. As such it was agreed
to opt for ‘stand alone’ electrical siren systems again,
communities having witnessed these in Bhandara
previously.
By the monsoon of 2007 systems were completed in all five
locations. The “watch” component was managed differently
in each community, but a common warning system was agreed
throughout the area, as a result of an inter-community
exchange programme. The first sounding of a siren indicated
that communities should prepare, while a second one meant
that they should evacuate. As sirens only transmitted so far,
communities established relay systems, reliant on volunteers
going door to door, to pass on warnings received.  Evacuation
in all locations was further assisted by other components of
the programme such as the improvement of bridges and
provision of boats.
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System components
Towers constructed incorporated improvements over
the pilot model including better weather protection,
safer ladders, tamper free construction methods and
fool-proof electrical component connections.
Critically they were built entirely using local labour,
which ensured increased community ownership and
a commitment to long term maintenance and repair.
With the aim of increasing siren range a 220/240
volt system was decided upon. This required the use
of inverters and greatly increased battery capacity
compared to the Bhandara system, with a users
manual being developed in tandem with training
given to community volunteers.
In use whilst siren range was found to be increased it
was not easy to justify the increased system
complication and cost (and hence reduced
sustainability) when compared to that established
during the trial phase. This became a major influence
on future system decisions.
Strengths
? Genuine intra-community warning systems were
established to which the siren was only a trigger.
? There is now additional time for people to gather family
members, valuable assets, live stock and stored food.
? The system has proved robust when external sources of
information have failed.
? Communities have felt empowered and increasingly secure.
? There is now less fatalism about floods and the
inevitability of the destruction that they bring.
Weaknesses
? Sirens, no matter how powerful, have limited range.
? It's been found that any warning will trigger an evacuation.
? Only limited extra warning time is given, of an hour or
two maximum, when more would be ideal.
? The system has low short term maintenance, but high
long term replacement costs, particularly of siren system
components.
14
7th September 2007 “Real time evaluation”
 “As soon as we heard the sound of the siren, we came
out of our house, we took our cattle to a nearby highland
area,  called  Thule Chour, and shifted our valuables
from the ground floor to the upper floor of the house.”
 – Basanta Chaudhari, a resident of Bagaincha tole
On 7th September 2007 local FM radio stations reported
the displacement of many people from riverside communities
within Nawalparasi.  To assess the situation first hand
Practical Actions Project Officer, Anup Phaiju, visited Laugai
in Pithauli and found that the occupants of seven houses
had moved to safer ground between 7.00 and 11.00 am on
the 6th of September.  Additionally Nur Bahardur Shrestha
and Kancha Gurung, community volunteers, had used boats
provided by the project to evacuate another 40 people.
“Now that we know when the floods are coming, my family doesn't have to take shelter on the roof
anymore! We have enough time to collect out valuables and use the bridge to reach a safer place.”
 – Mangali Kumal
Gairi,  a community nearby,  was also visited
where familiar faces were met, including members
of the PIC (Project Implementation Committee).
They had actually sounded their siren for the
first time at 8:30 pm the previous evening,
following a sponteneous bank-side meeting.  After
assessing the situation it had been collectively
decided the threat was sufficiently high to warrant
a warning and as such the siren had been sounded
as darkness fell.
“It wasn’t in our minds that the sound from
the siren could also be the sound for help, so
we were astounded when we saw the people
gathered.”
– Hom Bahadur Gurung
The community reacted promptly, relaying the
warning house to house with many people moving
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along with their goods and livestock. Interestingly,
while it was communicated previously during a
door-to-door campaign that people only needed
to leave their homes after the second sounding in
reality very few decided to wait !  Also, surprisingly,
many people from safe, upland areas, on hearing
the siren came to help those evacuating, offering
accommodation and assistance.
“We are surprised that the people from the
upland area came to help the flood victims.”
- Kum Bahadur Gurung (PIC Chairperson)
A critical piece of information gained at this point
was that while the community in Pithauli had tried
to warn their down stream counter parts, in
Kolhuwa, Narayani and Prasauni, it had proved
impossible.  The washing away of a 40 metre
section of the main east west highway had severed
optical fibres, rendering telephone networks
useless and leaving communities entirely isolated from outside support. This tended to support some of the
assumptions underpinning Practical Action's original decisions on the form that the EWS should take, namely
that systems should not rely on outside sources of information or warning unless these could be guaranteed
in regards to accuracy (of information)
and reliability (technically) of supply.
“We community people must work
together to help ourselves. Just like
now it will always be possible that
external help might not come as the
telephones might fail again.”
- Bhagawati Gautam
This experience greatly influenced
Practical Action’s next stage of EWS
development.
It was clear that if information was to
be reliably supplied over long distance, very robust communication systems and/or multiple channels of
communication would be required to avoid similar failures.
16
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In early 2007 Practical Action researched other areaswhich could benefit from the establishment of EWS.During 2005 and 2006 Banke and Bardia districts of
Mid-Western Nepal had suffered disproportionately, both in
terms of loss of life and assets, and as such were prioritised
as targets.
The systems established could afford and ultimately
required a more ambitious approach to early warning than
had been attempted previously however, as at the higher
level district government buy-in was now anticipated,
though in no way taken for granted, as was the support of
the DH&M, with whom Practical Action was in dialogue.
Similarly at the ‘last mile’ stage greater understanding of
the abilities and capacities of communities to manage
systems lead Practical Action to aim for bolder targets in
terms of coverage and reach.
The communities Practical Action targeted in each district
had similar profiles so, as previously, the approach was to
promote a broad, community based DRR programme in
each location. To kick start the EWS component both
community members and partner organisation staff from
Chitwan and Nawalaparasi visited the new sites to share
their own experiences of EWS and what was being achieved
in their own communities.
These activities not only ‘fast tracked’ communities and
partners alike, but helped to encourage the development of
an informal national early warning users network, a long term
ambition of Practical Action.
Communities on the West Rapti and Babai rivers
Practical Action, and its partners CSDR and RKJS, targeted the historically most flood prone communities in
Banke and Bardia, selecting Holiya, Betahani and Phatepur on the West Rapti river in Banke,  and Mohamadpur
and selected Wards of Gulariya municipality on the Babai river in Bardia. These communities all have similarities
being;
? At the extreme downstream (India border) reaches of major river systems.
? On river systems where flow levels are influenced by rainfall far upstream.
? In areas where floods have been occurring more regularly in recent years.
? In areas where evacuation in case of flood might take many hours.
? Recipients of relief assistance during times of flood but lacking any long term developmental inputs.
? In areas of high poverty, low income and low private land ownership.
? Socially, religiously and ethnically diverse.
In total over 86,000 people now benefit directly from the two river system based EWS established.
“If we can make early warning
effective and efficient, the
necessity for rescue can be
reduced – if we can manage
better with what we have I
don't think we need 'big'
technologies, we don't need
more resources and we don't
need extra personnel.”
– Narendra Raj Sharma, CDO,
Banke
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Factors likely to influence the nature of the EWS were
discussed widely, with key considerations arising including;
? Limited, intermittent or absent mains electricity supply.
? Poor telephone connectivity.
? Low levels of private telephone ownership.
? Poor inter and intra community infrastructure and roads
(though some were being improved as part of the
programme).
? Limited technical skills within communities to manage
complicated systems hardware.
? River levels dependent on upstream rainfall patterns, so
beyond local community’s abilities to monitor or manage
through local observation.
? Poor links with, and some distrust of, government and
emergency service institutions.
The issue of making information “accessible”, in real
terms, called for simple leg work, setting up meetings
between DH&M staff and community members, and
very basic calculations.
The first stage was to gather DH&M river level records
from stations on the Babai and West Rapti for 2006 and
2007, as these were both years of flood, and recent
enough in people’s memories for them to be able to
remember specific dates and events. By asking
communities to identify the date on which rivers broke
their banks in these years it was possible to identify the
level at gauging stations on the same days, these pieces
of information being the first historical ‘benchmarks’.
When discussing these levels with community
members in Holiya (Banke), we were surprised to find
that one community member, Ram Kumar Bahun, had
detailed records giving clear measurements during
the previous monsoon periods. Discovering and using
such sources of local knowledge greatly cut down
the research and analysis needed and, critically,
ensured community members were at the heart of
the whole process of demystifying the official records.
Similarly by identifying the highest readings recorded at
gauging stations it was easy for communities to identify the
dates and levels recorded within their own communities,
people normally remembering these as specific levels on
houses, trees or other bits of community infrastructure.
As an example community members from Balapur in Ward
6 of Gulariya pinpointed 11 Bhadra 2063 (27th August)
as the day floods hit their village in 2006, with the waters
first entering at 6.00 am, reaching a peak at 10.00 am
and receding again by 6.00 pm (interestingly all time
calculations were based on discussions as to how long
Making sense of it all
? Limited indigenous knowledge or skills on which to draw
in relation to flood and early warning.
? Relatively high levels of FM radio ownership.
These led to the following decisions
1. That powered warning systems at the community level
were simply not viable, either technically or financially, if
reliability and sustainability were to be ensured.
2. That information from upstream locations was required
if genuine early warning was to be provided.
3. That genuinely representative committees and volunteer
groups had to be created if comprehensive coverage was
to be achieved in linguistically, religiously and ethnically
diverse communities.
Studying records maintained by Ram Kumar
Bahun (second left) in Holiya, Banke.
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4. That what ever systems were established they had to
link with district level emergency service bodies and
existing disaster response mechanisms.
To achieve these requirements and meet ambitious targets
for the programme a three pronged approach was decided
upon. This targeted district level “buy-in”, community level
capacity building, and the gaining of institutional support.
To achieve these an approach based on consultation,
discussion and mass participation was taken, starting with
the holding of a range of stakeholder meetings and
dialogues, some specialised others mixed, which have
continued throughout the programme.
Seeking Institutional Support
As local observation could not give sufficient warning
communities required the supply of information from far
upstream. It was known the DH&M had existing monitoring
stations so a series of visits took place to facilities on the
Babai (Bardia) and West Rapti (Banke) rivers. These visits
included district government and DH&M staff, community
members, police and military personnel and representatives
of the Red Cross and media.
Through inspection of resources, review of records and
discussion with the local DH&M “gauge readers” on site,
the existing capacity to provide information very quickly
became apparent and very active discussion, both in situ and
in the local media subsequently took place.
after ‘cock-crow’ certain events took place, rather than
specific times, due to limited access to watches/clocks,
particularly among women).
When discussing conditions in 2007, community
members, in both districts, identified 10th Shrawan 2064
(26th July) as the critical day. In Balapur the water first
entered the village at 8.00 am, reached its peak at 12.00
noon, stayed constant for a further 3 hours and by
7.00 pm had receded one foot from its high water level.
On the same day on the Rapti River the station at Kusum
recorded a level of 5.65 Metres, the highest level recorded
that year.
From this analysis (comparing gauge station figures with
community flood histories) it was relatively easy to
calculate;
1. The upstream river level at which down stream
inundation is first likely to occur (for each community).
2. The speed of flow between the gauge station and
the community during peak flood periods.
Given these two basic sets of data rough extrapolations
could be made for all upstream river levels i.e. what
these levels would mean in terms of flood for down
stream communities (when the flood would occur and
how high it would reach).
It should be noted that while Practical Action had access
to sophisticated computer modeling options to carry
out this work this approach was rejected as
1. there was no justification for resorting to ‘theoretical’
approaches when “real” data existed, and
2. it would have taken the process of data analysis out
of the hands of the communities and given it to
“experts”, thus undermining the whole objective of
demystify the information and empowering the
communities. It would also have precluded the
making of personal connections between the local
DH&M staff and community members so critical to
the systems long term sustainability.
PIC (Project Implementation Committee) Vice-Chairperson Mr.  Tihar
Bahadur Tharu (right), of ward 6 Gulariya, indicating the 2006 high
water level (the 2007 level is the white mark 50cm below).
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What became apparent from these visits was that;
? Comprehensive records existed for river levels, recorded
three times a day, but that these were gathered largely for
long term planning and historical purposes only.
? Real time transmission took place once a day, but only to
Kathmandu and India, with no onward dissemination
beyond.
? No extrapolation of data had been carried out to date,
so no understanding existed of what a given river level in
an upstream monitoring location might mean for
communities down stream.
? Technical difficulties or equipment deficiencies existed in
some monitoring sites making more regular or reliable
communication difficult.
? Enthusiasm and willingness existed on the part of gauge
readers to contribute to the proposed EWS.
Following the visits talks took place with staff of the DH&M
during meetings at the district level, which agreed the
following actions;
? DH&M would make available all historical and ‘real time’
information as outlined by district stakeholders as useful
for the purposes of early warning.
? Practical Action could pay for additional monitoring of
river levels, beyond the present three times a day, during
the monsoon, if these costs were covered by the DH&M
or district authorities in future years.
? Practical Action would work with local DH&M staff and
community members to turn raw river level data into
meaningful warning information based on the historical
memories of flood existing within communities.
? Practical Action would provided CDMA (cost effective
satelite telephones) for gauge stations were these did not
exist already, plus credit for the monsoon period, if
recurrent cost would be covered by the DH&M or
district authorities in future years.
? District authorities would coordinate the gathering of
lists of prioritised telephone numbers and locations to
contact in times of risk. These would be supplied to gauge
reading staff and all other contacts in the communication
system.
? FM radio stations would broadcast information as
supplied by DH&M staff.
Seeking district level “buy-in”
At the district level, the target was to demonstrate that
investing in EWS was worthwhile (in comparison to
investment in post-disaster response for example), that EWS
District stakeholders and media representatives discussing DH&M facilities at the Bahalubang meteorological station on the West Rapti river.
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were technically feasible, financially sustainable and would
not create unmanagable increases in workload. It was also
critical that district authorities be convinced that these were
‘their’ systems, as without official adoption there was little
hope of long term sustainability.
Initial exposure visits arguably achieved the first three
objective in one go, as it became clear that information
sources and all the information required already existed
(albeit in “raw" form), that communication systems could
certainly be established, and that the costs of obtaining the
information and improving the communication hardware
necessary would be minimal.
In terms of workload and management input further
discussions were required to jointly develop the
communication channels and system responsibilities. In
this Practical Action was confident similarly positive
outcomes would be achieved, as while a downward
“supply” structure and approach were initially discussed
at district level, discussions at community level were
already indicating a more direct “demand” system would
actually develop.
Communication diagram for Banke District giving key contact telephone numbers and names.
Poster in three languages
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Community mobilisation
At the field level public awareness activities had a greater
EWS focus than in previous projects and open discussion of
the opportunities and potentials for EWS in the area took
place from the outset. In looking at ways warning could be
disseminated at the “last mile” level the use of hand sirens
was eventually decided upon.
Pulling it all together
A number of meetings were held between January and July
2008 to discuss the development of the system, the
information channels required and the ‘warning’ to be
communicated.
These on-going discussions soon  revealed that no “warning”
as such would be necessary.  It was clear that communities,
having been involved in all exposure visits and system
discussions, were perfectly capable of interpreting river level
data if provided and could decide on the ‘trigger’ mechanisms
for warnings at community level themselves. Ultimately this
would have been necessary under any system anyway, as each
community has different levels of risk and exposure to flood,
not all being threatened equally. As such it was agreed that all
communities needed to receive was the river level information
from the upstream DH&M stations.
In looking at options to spread warning in Banke and
Bardia it was decided to take a different approach to
minimising coverage. Instead of minimising the range
of single warning systems, as in Chitwan and
Nawalparasi, it was decided to increase the number of
warning sites themselves, and thus increase coverage
in that way.
In a similar vein, and given that reliable electrical power
supply could not be guaranteed, non-electrical powered
options were explored, these being both more robust
and reliable, cheaper and ultimately more sustainable.
Previous research and advertising had failed to locate
Warning choices
suppliers in Nepal and as such these were sourced in India,
with two possible options being identified.  Quoted
specifications were similar so models of both were ordered
for testing. Both consisted of a hand powered single tone
siren, with a quoted range of 1km. Other options were
looked into, but no hand powered devise with a range
equaling these systems could be identified.
Samples of the two types were circulated extensively
throughout the project areas so that community members
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In terms of communication channels, all stakeholders were aware
of the difficulties which arise during the monsoon. Landlines
regularly get cut (as experienced previously in Nawalparasi),
cell phone networks crash, and individual mobiles become
inoperative due to more general electric failures.
As such for the gauge reader staff landline/cell phone links
were prioritsed in the first instance, for cost reasons, with
CDMA  as the back-up. In case of all these failing HF stations
operated by the police existed as additional back-up, police
stations being in close proximity to all DH&M facilites. As a
further back-up commitment was made by the military base
close to the Chepang station to provide a further HF
communication option on the Babai.
At the community level a comprehensive survey exercise
took place, geographically mapping all landline, mobile
and CDMA locations, as well as FM radio ownership.
Communities then prioritsed the numbers to be called in
the case of warning, ensuring a good geographic spread
throughout the communities (some being quite large).
Where major ‘gaps’ existed Practical Action provided
CDMA ‘phones at community level also, though it was
agreed any running costs for these would be borne by the
community themselves, their purpose being to receive
calls, not  make them.
At the central, district level, a similar exercise took place,
with a comprehensive list of 24hr hour contact details being
could familiarise themselves with them, test the options
side by side, and discuss their suitability and possible
shortcomings. Tests were carried out in both formal and
informal settings, with it being ensured that all major
stakeholders took part in a test in at least one location. As
such representatives from the military, police, Red Cross,
etc, all participated.
In experimentation, communities were asked for suggestions
as to their most effective use, this being an important process
in putting communities
firmly to the fore in
system set-up decision
making.
43 sirens, of the type
selected by end users,
have now been
distributed, with
communities in each
location deciding on
how they should be
dispersed and managed,
and how warnings should be relayed to individuals
and settlements beyond the range of the sirens.
During the testing community members from Practical
Action's previous project sites in Chitwan and
Nawlaparasi, who were visiting to assist new project
committees establish themselves, also took part. They
were so impressed by the hand sirens that it was agreed
to retro-supply these to the existing sites.
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The cost of sustainability ?
It is estimated that the entire recurrent costs for 2009, per watershed warning system, will be less than 20,000
rupees (£157 / ¤227 / $249).
In 2008 the cost of additional river level monitoring, above that already paid for by the DH&M, was 12,000
rupees (£95 / ¤137 / $150) per river system, with telephone charges being an additional 5,000 rupees (£39 /
¤59 / $62) per river. Telephone charges were lower than anticipated as the “demand” nature of the system
meant that after issuing
initial warnings gauge
readers simply had to field
requests for information,
rather than proactively
disseminating it themselves.
Beyond these costs the only
hardware “set-up” costs
were 79,900 rupees
(£629 / ¤908 / $997) spent
on 10 CDMA telephones
(5 for communities in
Bardia, 4 in Banke, and one
for the gauge reader at Chepang on the Babai river). In other locations, with better telephone connectivity, these
cost might be avoided entirely. FM stations, while requesting funding initially now realise broadcast of river levels
is a public service priority and as such are no longer charging.
"Last year we broadcast how many people had died or were missing.  This year we could broadcast
the warning that flood is coming."
– Lil Prakash Chand news coordinator of Bageswori FM
Beyond this the hosting of an annual pre-monsoon meeting, which occurs in most districts anyway, would be all
that would be required to ‘refresh’ the system and update and test communication channels.
With set-up and running costs such as these surely it is hard to argue against investment ?
gathered for district level stake holders. These included key
District Authority staff, police, armed police, army, Red Cross
and, critically, FM radio stations.
Once these channels and numbers had been agreed upon,
system ‘maps’ were printed and distributed to all
stakeholders, for location next to telephones and radios
incorporated in to the system.
These systems and plans were shared extensively, not least
during the annual “pre-monsoon” meetings, which are held
in every district administration in May or June.
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On 27th and 28th June 2008 rainfall had been extreme in
Kapilbastu and Dang with river levels on the West Rapti
in Banke rising alarmingly. At 7.30 am on 28th the level
reached 4.5 Meters at Kusum, the “trigger” level above
which community records indicated floods could be
expected in downstream settlements.
Bhadra Bahadur Thapa, the DH&M gauge reader at Kusum,
who had been checking the level regularly from early
morning, first telephoned Radheshyam Sunar, a PIC
member from Holiya, who responded by saying that he
would pass the message on locally to other community
members. Following this the message was passed on to
Sabitram Barma, also of Holiya, who took it upon himself
to inform other community members, starting the relay
system.
At 7.38 am, Bhadra informed the district Police office in
Banke, with the sub-inspector on duty understanding the
importance of the information and assuring him he would
pass it on to the District Administration Office and
outlying police posts within the communities themselves.
By 7.40 am, Tara Thapa, PIC Chair in Phattepur, was also informed, followed by Bageshwori FM, the main radio
station in Nepalgunj. They noted the flood measurements and committed to broadcast them during the next
bulletin.
At 7.50 am, Mr. Bhadra contacted Bhagauti Psd Barma, of Betahani, who was reported to be very excited on
receiving the warning. “You are our savior” he said, as conditions around Betahani gave no indication of
impending flood at this point - the reason being that much of the settled area of Betahani is well back from the
banks of the Rapti, and actually on a tributary called the Duduwa. This river was still low at the time of warning
and as such they thought, incorrectly, that they had nothing to fear. Mr. Barma asked that they be continuously
informed of any further river level increases.
Finally, just before 8.00 am, Bhadra called Narendra Raj Sharma, the CDO (Chief District Officer) of Banke,
and similarly informed him of the situation. The CDO thanked him for his work and asked him to continue
informing the community and media.
Real Life Testing:
The system in action
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Interestingly however, from this point on, there was no need to inform others as many
people were now contacting the gauge reader at Kusum direct, both from within the
vulnerable communities and the emergency services.
Mr. J. Pande, a Nepalganj based journalist, after hearing the news on Bageshwori FM at
10 am, repeatedly called Bhadra Bahadur for updates and water levels, calling 6 or 7 times
(i.e. nearly once an hour), as the gauge reader reported his last call around 7.00 pm, when
the message was “the maximum water level was 5.0 Meters at 6.50 pm, and it is now
gradually going down”.
Similarly Mr. Iswori Regmi, on behalf of the Banke chapter of the Nepal Red Cross Society, having become
aware of the situation, stayed in constant contact, as did offices of the police and Santosh Regmi, of Radio
Nepal, among the many media contacts.
“If we cannot inform people from here -
if there is no telephone or the police HF
set fails - I can warn people by going to
Kohalpur. It takes one hour to reach
Kohalpur, but 5 hours for flood to reach
the downstream communities !....I will
be more than happy to serve
next year also.”
– Bhadra Bahadur Thapa,
gauge reader at Kusum
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Community response
In Holiya and Betahani, while river levels grew dangerously high throughout the day the banks were never breached.
Thus while the situation was monitored intently, no siren warnings were issued. In Phattapur however the situation
was far more serious.
The chair of the PIC and other PIC members received information of the river level early in the day and started
monitoring the level at the river side from 10.40 am onwards. The water continuously rose and at 5.00 pm it started
to inundate the areas known as Joraiya, Khalla Tepari, Sidhanawa and Bishambharpur (Phattepur being very large,
nearly 20 Kms north to south).
With it getting late, water levels still rising, and with a history of high water levels and floods occurring during the
night, in consultation with Tara Thapa, Bishnu Adhikari, Maghu Chaudhari (PIC Members) and Krishna Chaudhari
and Guru Chaudhari (community volunteers) at 5.30 pm it was decided to sound the hand sirens in an hour if
there was no improvement.
At 6.30 pm sirens were sounded in the main centers of
population and the process started of relaying the
information throughout the area.
Many farmers in Joraiya, Khalla Tepari, Gulaldeva,
Bisambharpur and Sidhanawa, on hearing the warning,
started taking their ploughs, oxen and agricultural tools
to higher land. Traditionally farmers here leave their tools
and oxen near their farm land, as it can be distant from
their homes, but as in past years, when there was no
warning, they had often been lost, they moved them in
advance this time.
Fishermen, such as Balak Godia, Bahur Godia and their
friends, were fishing on the Rapti on 28th June. On hearing
the sound of the siren from the Joraiya area about
6.45 pm, they realised the threat and returned quickly to
the river bank, stating if they had not heard the siren
they might have remained fishing ‘till midnight, possibly
camping on one of the many islands in the river. If they
had it could have been disasterous.
In the event, on 28th June, the waters rose no more.  As reported by Bhadra Bahadur, at Kusum at 6.50 pm, they had
reached their peak and were now subsiding.  The ‘test’ however indicated a good decision making and dissemination
system had been set in place and would guarantee wide-scale warning in the case of a genuine flood.
Perhaps the greatest success of this “real time test” however was that throughout, community members were actively
gathering information as opposed to passively receiving warnings, which was always the ambition of the system.
During 2008 real life tests of the system took placeon the Babai river in Bardia on 15th June, 27thAugust and 20th September. On the West Rapti in
Banke they occurred on the 28th June and 21st September.
Previously “Mock Drills” had also been held in each location,
just in case such real life testing had not occurred. In each
case the system worked as planned, with the initial supply of
raw river level information being sufficient to trigger
community mobilisation, observation and discussion, leading
to collective decision making over how and when to make
“official” warnings through use of the sirens.
Critically while Practical Action and its partners RKJS and
CSDR were included in the communication channels during
initial warnings, by September 2008 the system had largely
dispensed with the need for their involvement. Links and
mutual understanding had been created between community
members and DH&M staff in both districts, with the
communication channels established linking these to existing
district level government and emergency service systems
and local radio stations.
Practical Action and its partners CSDR, RKJS, SAHAMATI
and CSC believe their activities in piloting EWS in Nepal
have highlighted the applicability, cost effectiveness,
utility and critically, the replicability of the systems
trialed to date.
In areas where communication difficulties, lack of upstream
information sources or the nature of flood preclude long
distance warning (as in the case of flash flood) community
based “Watch and Warn” activities can play an important
role in reducing people's vulnerabilities. In the right
circumstances even a few minutes warning can allow for
the moving of livestock or seeds, household necessities
or farm implements, the loss of which might otherwise
set back a household or community for years. The role
EWS can play in livelihood protection can not be
overstated.
On more major river systems, where flow times can be
great and where monitoring infrastructure and staff
already exist, Practical Action’s programme has
demonstrated that warning of many hours duration can
be achieved through minimal investment. In much of flood
prone Nepal Practical Action is convinced this is where
and how investment should be made. EWS can benefit
those most at risk.
In establishing systems however the principal of “end user
first” is critical, with users being at the core of the system,
not beneficiaries of it. As such, in setting up EWS Practical
Action strongly recommends the following considerations
be incorporated.
? Integrate EWS within the framework of broader DRR
activities, as to try to establish them in isolation is unlikely
to result in success.
? Systems must prioritise software components, public
awareness activities and demystifying early warning.
There are no shortcuts or technical quick fixes if
sustainability is to be achieved.
? Systems must supply information, not warning per se,
and communities must be involved in the interpretation
of information and encouraged to actively engage with
information providers.
? Popular media, primarily FM radio, must be encouraged
to act in a public service capacity as a key ‘amplifier’ of
information supplied.
? Systems must be set up on an information “demand”
model, not one of “supply”.
? Communication and warning “technology”  should only
be added to the “mix” at the final stages of system set-up.
? Use existing resources, structures, information sources
and technologies where ever they exist.
The Future
P ractical Action has been working on community based EWS (early warning  systems)in Nepal since 2002 - specifically on systems which give early warning of flood. As aresult of its own learning, on-going community feedback, and “real time” evaluation,
Practical Action has become convinced of a number of key issues.
? Investment in EWS is a cost effective use of limited resources where risk can be
anticipated and measured. Vulnerable communities have a right to such warning.
? High tech/high cost systems are not only inappropriate but unsustainable. Use of
local resources both cuts costs and ensures greater ownership.
? Systems should provide information, not warnings per se. Making information intelligible
and user friendly are fundamental to any system.
? Users of information should be active participants in systems, not beneficiaries of
them. Systems must be established which put users first and at their centre.
? Systems should be based on the principal of “demand for”, not “supply of” information.
? Successful EWS are the product of effective person to person communication and
efficient social networks. Communication technologies merely complement these.
? Systems should dictate the technology and not technology the system.
We hope this publication helps summarise Practical Action’s learning in EWS and offers
practical insight in to how such systems can be replicated and developed elsewhere. We
encourage you to make use of the information included on the enclosed CD/DVDs as
limited space has precluded the sharing of all the information available in one publication.
Additional information can also be found at www.practicalaction.org/earlywarning
Project CD This CD contains an electronic version of
the text contained in this book in both PDF and Text
formats. The documents are provided so users can edit
and use elements of the text as they require.
Practical Action actively encourages such use
and asks simply that the source of the
original be acknowledged in any use.
The CD also contains over 70
pages of “Set-up Notes” on
which the text of the River
Basin Systems section is
based, design documents
for EWS towers
established in Chitwan
and Nawalparasi, PDF
files of awareness
materials used
during the projects
and other
background
material.
Project DVD This 30 minute film
covers the various stages in the
setting up and functioning of all
systems highlighted in this
book. It is intended as a
briefing and training
resource and is available
for transmission in any
forum without the
prior approval of
Practical Action or
the European
Commission
though credit
should be given.
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